The Red Zone
Ron Wolfley
Cardinals Analyst
The Cardinals impressive win over the defending Super Bowl champions raised a few eyebrows in the play-by-play booth. Although the first-unit couldn’t run the ball effectively, they remained committed to the run. And most importantly, the offense was three-for-three in the red-zone, scoring touchdowns with a bravado fans haven’t seen in quite some time.
To many, the explanation for this is obvious: it was a pre-season football game. The Steelers didn’t play their first-team defense for two of those scoring drives. The Cardinals kept their starting offense in the game much longer than most people anticipated. The Steelers have nothing to prove. The Cardinals were playing in their new home and were motivated. The Steelers weren’t trying. The Cardinals were trying. And so it goes.
But a closer look at what actually transpired encouraged some of the most hardened critics of a year ago. No, the Cardinals were not able to get their running game going and unless they fix it they will never be a juggernaut, especially in the red-zone. Albeit a pre-season opener, the point is to score touchdowns; how you do it doesn’t matter. What matters is the Cardinals were 100% in touchdown conversions inside the 25-yardline. And they were two-for-two in goal-to-goal situations, numbers they could only dream of a year ago.
In order to understand the loaded-gun that could be the Cardinals 2006 offense, one must understand the inherent difficulties involved in pushing the “pig” into the end zone. The “red-zone,” traditionally speaking, is usually considered to include the opponent’s 20-yardline to their goal-line. Some teams consider the 25-yardline and in the red-zone. I have even played for a coach that changed it from week-to-week based on the opponent.
The reason for this red-zone-diversity can be found in the roots of how the “red-zone” came to be part of football’s modern vernacular. In a massive simplification, defenses changed the way or style they typically used out on the field once offenses got into scoring position. Teams that played a “bend-but-don’t-break” defense might become more aggressive, taking chances, attempting to push the offense back out of field-goal range. Teams that were more aggressive out on the field of play, blitzing defenders and playing man-coverage, might start playing more zone cover-schemes, hoping to come up with an interception.
Scoring position meant a high probability the offense would either come away with a touchdown or a field-goal. In the NFL, most kickers are fairly accurate from inside 40-yards. If you put the ball on the 20-yardline, even if the offense doesn’t gain another yard the kicker is looking at a 37-yard field-goal. Rather than squabble over the exact location of this high-percentage chance of putting points on the board, most coaches reduced the math to a simple stripe: the 20-yardline.
Although these are not absolutes, the point is this: most defenses have real tendencies they play when an opponent gets in scoring position and those tendencies often differ from what they do on the rest of the field and those differences occur, give or take a few yards, around the 20-yardline.
But the difficulty in scoring a touchdown deep within an opponent’s part of the field is not only due to a change in scheme, it also involves a rudimentary truth, a natural law of football: the carnage a team can inflict on another increases as the field of play decreases.
There are 11-players on the field for each team, 22-players overall. An NFL gridiron is 360’ long by 160’ wide, with 30’ deep end-zones. If an offense has the ball on the 50-yardline, that offense has 33,600 square-feet of field in which to operate, or roughly 1,527 square-feet per player. If the offense has the ball on their opponent’s 20-yardline, that same offense now has only 14,400 square-feet of field in which to operate. The square-footage, of course, is now greatly reduced, yielding roughly 654 square-feet of playing surface per player. I’m sure you see the problem. Let the carnage begin.
But what does all of this mean?
It means this: if the Arizona Cardinals can run the ball with any type of consistency they are going to be a veritable nightmare in the red-zone.
Of the teams in 2005 that had a championship caliber, red-zone touchdown-percentage – 60% conversion rate or better – five of them were in the top-ten in rushing. This should surprise no one. If an offense can run the ball effectively in the red-zone the lack of square-footage doesn’t matter. In addition, if an offense can run the ball in the red-zone all three-components of offensive football are at their disposal. They can run the ball. They can throw the ball. Or they can act like they’re going to run the ball and then throw it using play-action. Two of the three components are predicated on being able to run the ball effectively.
But in regard to red-zone touchdown-percentage, what may surprise many is that New England (T-#3), Indianapolis (T-#5) and Carolina (#8) were numbers 24, 16 and 19, respectively, in rushing offense. These teams were hardly juggernauts in terms of running the football.
Why were they so adept in the red-zone, even though they struggled or were just average running the ball? They had great skill-players at key positions and remained committed to the running game.
The Arizona Cardinals have some of the best skill-players in the National Football League – believe it! Kurt Warner, Edgerrin James, Anquan Boldin, Larry Fitzgerald and Bryant Johnson will keep many defensive-coordinators as busy as a Krispy Kreme on a fat-farm.
What’s more, they have a vertical game – a third-dimension, if you will – that may be unmatched in the league. The Cardinals’ wide-receivers are BIG and have great leaping ability. Throw in the Cardinals third-round draft-pick, Leonard Pope, running down the seam at 6-8 and you begin to see the vertical-advantage. If you can’t go in or out, go up.
The name of the game is scoring touchdowns. Cardinals fans, experts and critics alike are wringing their hands over the lack of production in the running game on Saturday. There is no doubt the Cardinals need to do a better job running the football – no one here is disputing that. But, as the old saying goes: “The only thing more powerful than money is the promise of money.” Or as I contend: The only thing more powerful than Edgerrin James is the promise of Edgerrin James.
The Cardinals averaged 3.2-yards per rushing attempt in 2005, dead last in the league. Indianapolis averaged 3.7, and New England and Carolina averaged a surprisingly low 3.4-yards per rushing attempt. The Cardinals must improve but they don’t have to be the four-horseman of the apocalypse.
The Edge demands respect and defensive-coordinators are going to give it to him. Imagine if the Cardinals improve their rushing-attack by half-a-yard, putting them on par with Indianapolis’ 2005 performance. How much better would the Cardinals offense be in the red-zone with this modest achievement?
The Cardinals need to run the football better and unlock two of the three components of solid offensive football. But as long as they have Warner throwing the ball and James keeping defenses honest, the days of a one-dimensional red-zone-offense will be a distant memory for fans. Even if the Cardinals are not one of the top-ten rushing teams in the league, their scoring woes may drift away in 2006, lost in the third-dimension of the gridiron/space continuum. After all, winning games is about scoring points and you don’t score points with style.
Ron Wolfley
Cardinals Analyst
The Cardinals impressive win over the defending Super Bowl champions raised a few eyebrows in the play-by-play booth. Although the first-unit couldn’t run the ball effectively, they remained committed to the run. And most importantly, the offense was three-for-three in the red-zone, scoring touchdowns with a bravado fans haven’t seen in quite some time.
To many, the explanation for this is obvious: it was a pre-season football game. The Steelers didn’t play their first-team defense for two of those scoring drives. The Cardinals kept their starting offense in the game much longer than most people anticipated. The Steelers have nothing to prove. The Cardinals were playing in their new home and were motivated. The Steelers weren’t trying. The Cardinals were trying. And so it goes.
But a closer look at what actually transpired encouraged some of the most hardened critics of a year ago. No, the Cardinals were not able to get their running game going and unless they fix it they will never be a juggernaut, especially in the red-zone. Albeit a pre-season opener, the point is to score touchdowns; how you do it doesn’t matter. What matters is the Cardinals were 100% in touchdown conversions inside the 25-yardline. And they were two-for-two in goal-to-goal situations, numbers they could only dream of a year ago.
In order to understand the loaded-gun that could be the Cardinals 2006 offense, one must understand the inherent difficulties involved in pushing the “pig” into the end zone. The “red-zone,” traditionally speaking, is usually considered to include the opponent’s 20-yardline to their goal-line. Some teams consider the 25-yardline and in the red-zone. I have even played for a coach that changed it from week-to-week based on the opponent.
The reason for this red-zone-diversity can be found in the roots of how the “red-zone” came to be part of football’s modern vernacular. In a massive simplification, defenses changed the way or style they typically used out on the field once offenses got into scoring position. Teams that played a “bend-but-don’t-break” defense might become more aggressive, taking chances, attempting to push the offense back out of field-goal range. Teams that were more aggressive out on the field of play, blitzing defenders and playing man-coverage, might start playing more zone cover-schemes, hoping to come up with an interception.
Scoring position meant a high probability the offense would either come away with a touchdown or a field-goal. In the NFL, most kickers are fairly accurate from inside 40-yards. If you put the ball on the 20-yardline, even if the offense doesn’t gain another yard the kicker is looking at a 37-yard field-goal. Rather than squabble over the exact location of this high-percentage chance of putting points on the board, most coaches reduced the math to a simple stripe: the 20-yardline.
Although these are not absolutes, the point is this: most defenses have real tendencies they play when an opponent gets in scoring position and those tendencies often differ from what they do on the rest of the field and those differences occur, give or take a few yards, around the 20-yardline.
But the difficulty in scoring a touchdown deep within an opponent’s part of the field is not only due to a change in scheme, it also involves a rudimentary truth, a natural law of football: the carnage a team can inflict on another increases as the field of play decreases.
There are 11-players on the field for each team, 22-players overall. An NFL gridiron is 360’ long by 160’ wide, with 30’ deep end-zones. If an offense has the ball on the 50-yardline, that offense has 33,600 square-feet of field in which to operate, or roughly 1,527 square-feet per player. If the offense has the ball on their opponent’s 20-yardline, that same offense now has only 14,400 square-feet of field in which to operate. The square-footage, of course, is now greatly reduced, yielding roughly 654 square-feet of playing surface per player. I’m sure you see the problem. Let the carnage begin.
But what does all of this mean?
It means this: if the Arizona Cardinals can run the ball with any type of consistency they are going to be a veritable nightmare in the red-zone.
Of the teams in 2005 that had a championship caliber, red-zone touchdown-percentage – 60% conversion rate or better – five of them were in the top-ten in rushing. This should surprise no one. If an offense can run the ball effectively in the red-zone the lack of square-footage doesn’t matter. In addition, if an offense can run the ball in the red-zone all three-components of offensive football are at their disposal. They can run the ball. They can throw the ball. Or they can act like they’re going to run the ball and then throw it using play-action. Two of the three components are predicated on being able to run the ball effectively.
But in regard to red-zone touchdown-percentage, what may surprise many is that New England (T-#3), Indianapolis (T-#5) and Carolina (#8) were numbers 24, 16 and 19, respectively, in rushing offense. These teams were hardly juggernauts in terms of running the football.
Why were they so adept in the red-zone, even though they struggled or were just average running the ball? They had great skill-players at key positions and remained committed to the running game.
The Arizona Cardinals have some of the best skill-players in the National Football League – believe it! Kurt Warner, Edgerrin James, Anquan Boldin, Larry Fitzgerald and Bryant Johnson will keep many defensive-coordinators as busy as a Krispy Kreme on a fat-farm.
What’s more, they have a vertical game – a third-dimension, if you will – that may be unmatched in the league. The Cardinals’ wide-receivers are BIG and have great leaping ability. Throw in the Cardinals third-round draft-pick, Leonard Pope, running down the seam at 6-8 and you begin to see the vertical-advantage. If you can’t go in or out, go up.
The name of the game is scoring touchdowns. Cardinals fans, experts and critics alike are wringing their hands over the lack of production in the running game on Saturday. There is no doubt the Cardinals need to do a better job running the football – no one here is disputing that. But, as the old saying goes: “The only thing more powerful than money is the promise of money.” Or as I contend: The only thing more powerful than Edgerrin James is the promise of Edgerrin James.
The Cardinals averaged 3.2-yards per rushing attempt in 2005, dead last in the league. Indianapolis averaged 3.7, and New England and Carolina averaged a surprisingly low 3.4-yards per rushing attempt. The Cardinals must improve but they don’t have to be the four-horseman of the apocalypse.
The Edge demands respect and defensive-coordinators are going to give it to him. Imagine if the Cardinals improve their rushing-attack by half-a-yard, putting them on par with Indianapolis’ 2005 performance. How much better would the Cardinals offense be in the red-zone with this modest achievement?
The Cardinals need to run the football better and unlock two of the three components of solid offensive football. But as long as they have Warner throwing the ball and James keeping defenses honest, the days of a one-dimensional red-zone-offense will be a distant memory for fans. Even if the Cardinals are not one of the top-ten rushing teams in the league, their scoring woes may drift away in 2006, lost in the third-dimension of the gridiron/space continuum. After all, winning games is about scoring points and you don’t score points with style.
