I'm not a big fan of John Hollinger, but I did appreciate these two articles on the winners and losers of free agency so far. The winners are in another thread.
Hornets, Raptors may live to regret bold moves
By John Hollinger
ESPN Insider
Archive
The hard truth about sports is that not everyone comes out on top. For every winner, there must be a loser. So, to go along with my column on the three offseason winners (so far), here are the three teams that that probably have done more harm than good to themselves the past week:
New Orleans/Oklahoma City Hornets
When it comes to personnel decisions, the single biggest mistake teams make is not being honest with themselves about where they stand. Examples abound, but one that sticks out came two years ago. That's when the 76ers imagined themselves to be a player away from contention and pulled the trigger on a deal for Chris Webber, a trade that only put them further away from the promised land and will probably result in Allen Iverson's departure this summer.
This year's better-take-another-look-in-the-mirror award goes to the Hornets, who apparently think they're on the cusp of something big. How else to explain the free-agent acquisitions of Peja Stojakovic and Bobby Jackson, or the trade for Tyson Chandler?
The Jackson addition can at least be written off as a wash. The man he replaces, Speedy Claxton, was an energizing, shoot-first backup point guard who will spend 30 games on the injured list next year -- just like Jackson, in other words. No harm, no foul on that one.
The Peja deal is harder to stomach. I talked in the winners column about teams signing players to big free-agent deals and then feverishly trying to unload them just a year or two later. This contract seems like a mortal lock to fall in that category.
Stojakovic will be making $13 million a year for the next five years, even though he's barely been worth half of that over the past two seasons. He's also had injuries to virtually every square inch of his legs in that time -- plantar fasciitis, sprained ankles, pulled hamstrings, sore knees -- which should be a giant red flag for any team about to sign him to a long-term deal that runs into his 30s.
When the Hornets are trying to unload Stojakovic in the summer of 2008, they'll also be desperately seeking takers for the final three years of Tyson Chandler's six-year, $60 million deal. (And unfortunately for the Hornets, Isiah Thomas probably will be out of a job by then.)
The Stojakovic and Chandler acquisitions might be acceptable if the Hornets were a veteran, 50-win team trying to make one last push for the ring. This team desperately needed shooting, and Stojakovic certainly can shoot the ball as well as anyone in the game.
It also lacked size in the middle, so adding Chandler to the mix should put the Hornets ahead on that front, too. Of course, cynics will point out that the Hornets already drafted not one but two big men that can't score (Hilton Armstrong and Cedric Simmons), so adding Chandler to the mix seems like a Department of Redundancy Department special.
Let's get back to that pesky mirror, though.
Stojakovic and Chandler will probably help, but will it really matter if they do? The Hornets won 38 games a year ago, and were significantly worse than their record indicated -- based on points scored and points allowed, they could have expected to go 31-51. Thus, even with Stojakovic and Chandler, they could easily end up south of .500.
Moreover, the two contracts they took on mean the Hornets' rebuilding effort is essentially over already. Even after signing Stojakovic, they were looking at having significant cap space again next summer because the contracts of P.J. Brown, Marc Jackson, Desmond Mason and Moochie Norris were coming off the books. Instead, they've essentially opted to have Chandler be their free-agent signing for 2007. That is, unless they don't plan on extending David West this fall, which would be an odd move considering he's twice the player Chandler is.
(Incidentally, this is why we shouldn't be too quick to pat Hornets owners George Shinn on the back for spending money. Even after all this action, the team is under the luxury tax and will barely be over the cap next year.)
The Hornets should have gone in an opposite direction from the one they took.
Rather than trade a 20-year-old with J.R. Smith's potential, they should be exploring ways to mend his relationship with Byron Scott.
Rather than targeting Stojakovic, Jackson and Chandler, they should be focused on adding less expensive players with greater upside -- Jackie Butler instead of Chandler, Eddie House instead of Jackson. And, if they were really that desperate for a shooter, Vladimir Radmanovic instead of Stojakovic.
They'd be slightly worse in 2006-07, but have much more room to maneuver in the future.
Instead, because they weren't honest with themselves, the Hornets may have inadvertently made themselves the new 76ers -- a capped-out 38-win team that has itself painted into a corner with untradable contracts.
Toronto Raptors
Between the draft and free agency, a little deal between Toronto and Milwaukee got lost in the shuffle. It shouldn't have, because it's potentially one of the most one-sided trades of the decade.
Just before free agency opened, the Raptors dealt forward Charlie Villanueva to the Bucks in return for guard T.J. Ford. There were no draft picks or deadweight contracts thrown in -- it was just Ford for Villanueva, straight up. As such, it was one of the more baffling deals I've ever seen.
As with most one-sided deals, it came about because a team had a need at a position and decided to overpay to meet it. With Mike James's impending free agency, Toronto found itself needing a point guard, and in Villanueva had a surplus forward to use as the bait.
The problem is that now the Raptors don't have Villanueva . . . and they still need a point guard. Ford is a fine energizer as a 20-minute guy off the bench, but as the Bucks learned last season, he leaves much to be desired as a starter.
Ford's inability to shoot makes it easy to defend him in pick-and-roll situations and encourages opponents to play zones -- especially since the Raptors don't have a Michael Redd to keep opponents honest. And on defense, his 5-foot-10 frame (or 6-0, if you believe the official listing) makes him ripe for abuse by all but the smallest opposing point guards.
Ford is also a major injury risk, missing the entire 2004-05 season after bruising his spinal cord -- the result of a condition called spinal stenosis that makes him vulnerable to this sort of injury. Plus, at 165 pounds, it's not like his neck is the only body part that's at risk.
Then there's the salary angle. Ford is eligible for an extension this summer, while Villanueva will be playing for peanuts for three more seasons.
Since the Raptors just traded for Ford, from a face-saving perspective it will be very difficult for them not to extend his deal -- otherwise, why trade a popular rookie for a guy who leaves after one season as a free agent? And since Ford's agent undoubtedly knows this, the price is likely to be much higher than it ought to be.
Even if they made the same money, or had the same injury risk, or were the same age (Villanueva is more than a year younger), this deal is a tough one to fathom.
Villanueva finished second in the Rookie of the Year voting after a stellar 2005-06 season which include a 48-point explosion against the Bucks in March. He is 6-11, rebounds well, can handle the ball and has 3-point range. Basically, he's the prototypical modern power forward. Yes, he sometimes loses concentration and his defense needs a lot of work, but the talent disparity in this trade is simply enormous.
The thing that really puzzles me about this deal is that Bryan Colangelo was the one pulling the trigger for Toronto. Nearly everything he touched turned to gold in Phoenix, and his first move with the Raptors seemed just as astute -- swinging the little-discussed Rafael Araujo-Kris Humphries deal that bought him some extra cap space this summer and, if he gets lucky, a real basketball player instead of Araujo.
But trading Villanueva for Ford? Sorry folks, I have to call 'em like I see 'em, and I see this one as being just astoundingly stupid. Even if they'd decided to get rid of Villanueva -- a defensible position, considering the Raptors' surplus of big forwards -- they had to be able to get much more than this in return. And if this was really all the market would bear, they should have waited 'til the trade deadline.
But most of all, they shouldn't have done this deal. Villanueva is a rising star. Ford is a backup-quality point guard who will cost more and has much greater odds of getting hurt.
By swapping the two, Toronto took a major step backward, and Milwaukee an equally big step ahead.
Detroit Pistons
They fall in this category not because they failed to match the Bulls' offer to Ben Wallace, but because of the poor planning that preceded it. All of Detroit's moves of the past 12 months were predicated on the idea that they would re-sign Wallace and go on merrily winning. So how did they end up failing to keep Wallace and having Nazr Mohammed as the fallback position?
When Joe Dumars traded Darko Milicic and Carlos Arroyo to the Magic at midseason, his logic was that Milicic wasn't ever going to get a chance to play in Detroit with Wallace around and that his team needed space under the luxury tax in order to keep Big Ben. That would have been fine and dandy if he had read the market for Wallace correctly, but he didn't.
In a market where five teams had max-contract cap space but Wallace was the only All-Star caliber free agent, Dumars had to know that somebody was going to step forward with an over-the-top offer to try to lure Wallace away. So at the time he dealt Milicic, he should have been looking at only two alternatives -- matching the inevitable insane offer for Wallace, or making contingency plans.
Instead, he went halfway -- dumping just enough salary to make a halfway decent offer for Wallace and counting on Wallace's loyalty to prevail over the dollar signs. That's not the way to bet, my friends.
As a result, instead of being able to plug Darko in at center, having Arroyo around to back up the point and keeping enough assets to make a run at Al Harrington, Dumars is trying to plug several holes at once while his team is over the salary cap.
(And while we're talking about Detroit salary dumps, what about inexplicably giving away Maurice Evans last week to the Lakers for a second-round draft pick? His $1.5 million is one of the league's biggest bargains, and they just donate him to L.A. for no reason? Huh?)
I'll give Detroit a mulligan if they somehow entice the Hawks to sign and trade Harrington, but considering the Hawks' needs at point guard and center and Detroit's inability to meet them, I can't see it happening.
And while I like Mohammed -- an intelligent, underrated, low-key guy who will fit perfectly in Detroit -- it's going to be tough for Detroit to keep contending for titles with such a drop-off at the center spot.
Until or unless Dumars can make a follow-up move that radically alters the picture, the Pistons join the Raptors and Hornets as the summer's biggest losers.
Hornets, Raptors may live to regret bold moves
By John Hollinger
ESPN Insider
Archive
The hard truth about sports is that not everyone comes out on top. For every winner, there must be a loser. So, to go along with my column on the three offseason winners (so far), here are the three teams that that probably have done more harm than good to themselves the past week:
New Orleans/Oklahoma City Hornets
When it comes to personnel decisions, the single biggest mistake teams make is not being honest with themselves about where they stand. Examples abound, but one that sticks out came two years ago. That's when the 76ers imagined themselves to be a player away from contention and pulled the trigger on a deal for Chris Webber, a trade that only put them further away from the promised land and will probably result in Allen Iverson's departure this summer.
This year's better-take-another-look-in-the-mirror award goes to the Hornets, who apparently think they're on the cusp of something big. How else to explain the free-agent acquisitions of Peja Stojakovic and Bobby Jackson, or the trade for Tyson Chandler?
The Jackson addition can at least be written off as a wash. The man he replaces, Speedy Claxton, was an energizing, shoot-first backup point guard who will spend 30 games on the injured list next year -- just like Jackson, in other words. No harm, no foul on that one.
The Peja deal is harder to stomach. I talked in the winners column about teams signing players to big free-agent deals and then feverishly trying to unload them just a year or two later. This contract seems like a mortal lock to fall in that category.
Stojakovic will be making $13 million a year for the next five years, even though he's barely been worth half of that over the past two seasons. He's also had injuries to virtually every square inch of his legs in that time -- plantar fasciitis, sprained ankles, pulled hamstrings, sore knees -- which should be a giant red flag for any team about to sign him to a long-term deal that runs into his 30s.
When the Hornets are trying to unload Stojakovic in the summer of 2008, they'll also be desperately seeking takers for the final three years of Tyson Chandler's six-year, $60 million deal. (And unfortunately for the Hornets, Isiah Thomas probably will be out of a job by then.)
The Stojakovic and Chandler acquisitions might be acceptable if the Hornets were a veteran, 50-win team trying to make one last push for the ring. This team desperately needed shooting, and Stojakovic certainly can shoot the ball as well as anyone in the game.
It also lacked size in the middle, so adding Chandler to the mix should put the Hornets ahead on that front, too. Of course, cynics will point out that the Hornets already drafted not one but two big men that can't score (Hilton Armstrong and Cedric Simmons), so adding Chandler to the mix seems like a Department of Redundancy Department special.
Let's get back to that pesky mirror, though.
Stojakovic and Chandler will probably help, but will it really matter if they do? The Hornets won 38 games a year ago, and were significantly worse than their record indicated -- based on points scored and points allowed, they could have expected to go 31-51. Thus, even with Stojakovic and Chandler, they could easily end up south of .500.
Moreover, the two contracts they took on mean the Hornets' rebuilding effort is essentially over already. Even after signing Stojakovic, they were looking at having significant cap space again next summer because the contracts of P.J. Brown, Marc Jackson, Desmond Mason and Moochie Norris were coming off the books. Instead, they've essentially opted to have Chandler be their free-agent signing for 2007. That is, unless they don't plan on extending David West this fall, which would be an odd move considering he's twice the player Chandler is.
(Incidentally, this is why we shouldn't be too quick to pat Hornets owners George Shinn on the back for spending money. Even after all this action, the team is under the luxury tax and will barely be over the cap next year.)
The Hornets should have gone in an opposite direction from the one they took.
Rather than trade a 20-year-old with J.R. Smith's potential, they should be exploring ways to mend his relationship with Byron Scott.
Rather than targeting Stojakovic, Jackson and Chandler, they should be focused on adding less expensive players with greater upside -- Jackie Butler instead of Chandler, Eddie House instead of Jackson. And, if they were really that desperate for a shooter, Vladimir Radmanovic instead of Stojakovic.
They'd be slightly worse in 2006-07, but have much more room to maneuver in the future.
Instead, because they weren't honest with themselves, the Hornets may have inadvertently made themselves the new 76ers -- a capped-out 38-win team that has itself painted into a corner with untradable contracts.
Toronto Raptors
Between the draft and free agency, a little deal between Toronto and Milwaukee got lost in the shuffle. It shouldn't have, because it's potentially one of the most one-sided trades of the decade.
Just before free agency opened, the Raptors dealt forward Charlie Villanueva to the Bucks in return for guard T.J. Ford. There were no draft picks or deadweight contracts thrown in -- it was just Ford for Villanueva, straight up. As such, it was one of the more baffling deals I've ever seen.
As with most one-sided deals, it came about because a team had a need at a position and decided to overpay to meet it. With Mike James's impending free agency, Toronto found itself needing a point guard, and in Villanueva had a surplus forward to use as the bait.
The problem is that now the Raptors don't have Villanueva . . . and they still need a point guard. Ford is a fine energizer as a 20-minute guy off the bench, but as the Bucks learned last season, he leaves much to be desired as a starter.
Ford's inability to shoot makes it easy to defend him in pick-and-roll situations and encourages opponents to play zones -- especially since the Raptors don't have a Michael Redd to keep opponents honest. And on defense, his 5-foot-10 frame (or 6-0, if you believe the official listing) makes him ripe for abuse by all but the smallest opposing point guards.
Ford is also a major injury risk, missing the entire 2004-05 season after bruising his spinal cord -- the result of a condition called spinal stenosis that makes him vulnerable to this sort of injury. Plus, at 165 pounds, it's not like his neck is the only body part that's at risk.
Then there's the salary angle. Ford is eligible for an extension this summer, while Villanueva will be playing for peanuts for three more seasons.
Since the Raptors just traded for Ford, from a face-saving perspective it will be very difficult for them not to extend his deal -- otherwise, why trade a popular rookie for a guy who leaves after one season as a free agent? And since Ford's agent undoubtedly knows this, the price is likely to be much higher than it ought to be.
Even if they made the same money, or had the same injury risk, or were the same age (Villanueva is more than a year younger), this deal is a tough one to fathom.
Villanueva finished second in the Rookie of the Year voting after a stellar 2005-06 season which include a 48-point explosion against the Bucks in March. He is 6-11, rebounds well, can handle the ball and has 3-point range. Basically, he's the prototypical modern power forward. Yes, he sometimes loses concentration and his defense needs a lot of work, but the talent disparity in this trade is simply enormous.
The thing that really puzzles me about this deal is that Bryan Colangelo was the one pulling the trigger for Toronto. Nearly everything he touched turned to gold in Phoenix, and his first move with the Raptors seemed just as astute -- swinging the little-discussed Rafael Araujo-Kris Humphries deal that bought him some extra cap space this summer and, if he gets lucky, a real basketball player instead of Araujo.
But trading Villanueva for Ford? Sorry folks, I have to call 'em like I see 'em, and I see this one as being just astoundingly stupid. Even if they'd decided to get rid of Villanueva -- a defensible position, considering the Raptors' surplus of big forwards -- they had to be able to get much more than this in return. And if this was really all the market would bear, they should have waited 'til the trade deadline.
But most of all, they shouldn't have done this deal. Villanueva is a rising star. Ford is a backup-quality point guard who will cost more and has much greater odds of getting hurt.
By swapping the two, Toronto took a major step backward, and Milwaukee an equally big step ahead.
Detroit Pistons
They fall in this category not because they failed to match the Bulls' offer to Ben Wallace, but because of the poor planning that preceded it. All of Detroit's moves of the past 12 months were predicated on the idea that they would re-sign Wallace and go on merrily winning. So how did they end up failing to keep Wallace and having Nazr Mohammed as the fallback position?
When Joe Dumars traded Darko Milicic and Carlos Arroyo to the Magic at midseason, his logic was that Milicic wasn't ever going to get a chance to play in Detroit with Wallace around and that his team needed space under the luxury tax in order to keep Big Ben. That would have been fine and dandy if he had read the market for Wallace correctly, but he didn't.
In a market where five teams had max-contract cap space but Wallace was the only All-Star caliber free agent, Dumars had to know that somebody was going to step forward with an over-the-top offer to try to lure Wallace away. So at the time he dealt Milicic, he should have been looking at only two alternatives -- matching the inevitable insane offer for Wallace, or making contingency plans.
Instead, he went halfway -- dumping just enough salary to make a halfway decent offer for Wallace and counting on Wallace's loyalty to prevail over the dollar signs. That's not the way to bet, my friends.
As a result, instead of being able to plug Darko in at center, having Arroyo around to back up the point and keeping enough assets to make a run at Al Harrington, Dumars is trying to plug several holes at once while his team is over the salary cap.
(And while we're talking about Detroit salary dumps, what about inexplicably giving away Maurice Evans last week to the Lakers for a second-round draft pick? His $1.5 million is one of the league's biggest bargains, and they just donate him to L.A. for no reason? Huh?)
I'll give Detroit a mulligan if they somehow entice the Hawks to sign and trade Harrington, but considering the Hawks' needs at point guard and center and Detroit's inability to meet them, I can't see it happening.
And while I like Mohammed -- an intelligent, underrated, low-key guy who will fit perfectly in Detroit -- it's going to be tough for Detroit to keep contending for titles with such a drop-off at the center spot.
Until or unless Dumars can make a follow-up move that radically alters the picture, the Pistons join the Raptors and Hornets as the summer's biggest losers.
