Harry
ASFN Consultant and Senior Writer
First it’s certainly true I can no longer keep my mouth shut. I posted my broom comment and was immediately chastised for not justifying it and just sniping. So here it is.
I’ve been getting emails all year for board members and outsiders asking one question, “How did this happen?” I think the blame is equally shared between Wilks & Keim.
Starting with Wilks, the mistakes are fundamental. Without even going through camp he decided (though denying it) that the previously successful defense would shift from a 3-4 to. 4-3. There were no starting LBs that fit that pattern. The interior DL definitely was better rotating fresh guys in the middle. I’m not certain if he and Keim were talking (maybe the lanes were too narrow) but there seems to have been no effort to acquire appropriate LBs. Reddick seemed to finally be understanding his responsibility by the end of 2017, now he had to learn a whole new set of responsibilities. Adaptation is clearly is not his strongest skill. The decision to play mostly zone meant Peterson wouldn’t be taking out the other team’s primary receivers. He made a big effort in run support but once again not playing to a player’s biggest strength. The other major defensive issues fall to Keim but this defense would have functioned much better by staying with a system that was working.
On offense Wilks almost immediately announced the Cards would focus on the run without having any idea if they could block well enough or how well DJ would rebound. The Cards had been a “go long” team setting up the run with the pass. They had signed an immobile, passing QB to run the offense. They had drafted the QBOTF but there seemed no plan in place to develop him. Again there is no question Keim contributed to this problem. In fact he made running any offense a thankless task. However not centering the passing game around Fitz made it clear to me that once Rosen came in he seemed to be calling the shots. He preferred Kirk. I’m paraphrasing but I’m reminded of what Warner said, It took me a while to learn when Fitz was single covered that meant he was open.” Rosen never understood that. He waited for receivers to come open rather than asking a Fitz to make a play. They also decided the running game would go up the middle. With a weak passing attack the opposition stacked the line and quickly wore down DJ. Changing a bad OC for a rookie OC only helped slightly. In the end, however, there was virtually zero creativity. There was no “hurry up” or gimmick play calling. The scripted plays at the beginnning seemed to work a little, but once the offense had to flow the playing calling was stale. After the OC was changed, DJ was used as a receiver a little more but with a gutted RB corp, with DJ split out, there was no threat at RB. The team drafted a FB but rarely used him as a lead block or in max protection. We were told about Rosen’s great accuracy, but it was felt max protection wouldn’t give him enough open options. The Cards did better with screens but rarely attempted to move the pocket to keep the rush off balance. This offense was too dated to fly.
It would have been hard for any coach to succeed with this roster. That said the Cards’ brass must decide if Wilks was part of the problem. Since he gave no indication of being part of the solution. For me the answer was Wilks didn’t do enough to justify retention. In fact he waited too long to take responsibility for his part in the collapse. The buck stopped there.
I’ve been getting emails all year for board members and outsiders asking one question, “How did this happen?” I think the blame is equally shared between Wilks & Keim.
Starting with Wilks, the mistakes are fundamental. Without even going through camp he decided (though denying it) that the previously successful defense would shift from a 3-4 to. 4-3. There were no starting LBs that fit that pattern. The interior DL definitely was better rotating fresh guys in the middle. I’m not certain if he and Keim were talking (maybe the lanes were too narrow) but there seems to have been no effort to acquire appropriate LBs. Reddick seemed to finally be understanding his responsibility by the end of 2017, now he had to learn a whole new set of responsibilities. Adaptation is clearly is not his strongest skill. The decision to play mostly zone meant Peterson wouldn’t be taking out the other team’s primary receivers. He made a big effort in run support but once again not playing to a player’s biggest strength. The other major defensive issues fall to Keim but this defense would have functioned much better by staying with a system that was working.
On offense Wilks almost immediately announced the Cards would focus on the run without having any idea if they could block well enough or how well DJ would rebound. The Cards had been a “go long” team setting up the run with the pass. They had signed an immobile, passing QB to run the offense. They had drafted the QBOTF but there seemed no plan in place to develop him. Again there is no question Keim contributed to this problem. In fact he made running any offense a thankless task. However not centering the passing game around Fitz made it clear to me that once Rosen came in he seemed to be calling the shots. He preferred Kirk. I’m paraphrasing but I’m reminded of what Warner said, It took me a while to learn when Fitz was single covered that meant he was open.” Rosen never understood that. He waited for receivers to come open rather than asking a Fitz to make a play. They also decided the running game would go up the middle. With a weak passing attack the opposition stacked the line and quickly wore down DJ. Changing a bad OC for a rookie OC only helped slightly. In the end, however, there was virtually zero creativity. There was no “hurry up” or gimmick play calling. The scripted plays at the beginnning seemed to work a little, but once the offense had to flow the playing calling was stale. After the OC was changed, DJ was used as a receiver a little more but with a gutted RB corp, with DJ split out, there was no threat at RB. The team drafted a FB but rarely used him as a lead block or in max protection. We were told about Rosen’s great accuracy, but it was felt max protection wouldn’t give him enough open options. The Cards did better with screens but rarely attempted to move the pocket to keep the rush off balance. This offense was too dated to fly.
It would have been hard for any coach to succeed with this roster. That said the Cards’ brass must decide if Wilks was part of the problem. Since he gave no indication of being part of the solution. For me the answer was Wilks didn’t do enough to justify retention. In fact he waited too long to take responsibility for his part in the collapse. The buck stopped there.
