Harry
ASFN Consultant and Senior Writer
Review the selections of a hundred draft “experts” on this year’s draft and I guarantee you will see 100 different drafts. So how do you make your own grid work?
Well, if you’ve got the time, which I don’t this season, here’s some tips from a guy who’s done it since well before it became fashionable. Begin by playing the club not the prospect. What I mean is simple. Study the club’s recent draft history, especially if the personnel making the decisions remain unchanged. The recent Detroit history provides a good example. If you knew Matt Millen (and even if you didn’t) you could easily see that if he were a coach facing first and goal he’d run the ball. Even after that strategy failed 3 times in a row, he’d run on fourth and goal. He simply believes you do it until you get it right. So when he chose wide receivers 3 years in a row, it should have surprised no one. It also should have surprised no one that he’s not choosing anymore.
Another closely related tip is to see what positions the club has drafted in recent years, particularly in rounds one and two. Most clubs work under a few predictable philosophies. Many teams have positions they attack and ones they avoid. Denver hasn’t taken a running back in round 1 in more than 20 years. The last time they did (1985) they selected the forgettable Steve Sewell. On the other hand, when they have picks in the first two rounds (and sometimes when they don’t) they are almost certain to take a linebacker before round 3 begins. Several teams like to stack up linemen often on both sides of the ball. That’s the old “games are won in the trenches” philosophy.
Another old saw is the best player available theory. Bill Belichick is known for drafting the BPA way. It’s mostly true; though I would argue in recent years he’s moved to a more need-related strategy. Most teams operate under a similar compromise philosophy; they take the BPA but focus on a few positions to determine their BPA. There are still quite a few need-based teams and the Cards are high up on that list. Recent selections like Levi Brown and Alan Branch illustrate the dangers. These athletes often lack sufficient athleticism to play another position, so they are typically all-in propositions. Most teams in the latter group will switch to more of a BPA philosophy during rounds 4-7. During the last 2 rounds, many teams also focus almost exclusively of players who can immediately contribute on special teams.
A number of teams like to trade down; adding additional draft picks and thus not put all their eggs in a few baskets. This is especially true in round one. Others seem to move up and down in an opportunist mode, so their initial draft position means little.
Some selectors believe they are far better judges of talent than others. They make astonishing reaches that often result in disaster. They seek to impress everyone with their “superior” knowledge of quality players. Both Jimmy Johnson and Al Davis have fallen victim to this philosophy. On the other hand, Bill Belichick has proven year after year that he is a better judge of talent than his counterparts; usually bringing home a winner with these choices (like Logan Mankins).
If you want to really dig, see what combine stats teams value. Some teams like strength on their lines, others like agility. So look at previous draftee’s reps and cone drills. For other teams, it’s all about speed. Indy for example, loves speed. I know; Manning can’t run.
The last group to consider is the GM’s with history. Better yet, look for the ones not impressed by hype. The best GM out of a job is Charley Casserly. You may recall I was one of the few who championed his selection of Mario Williams over Reggie Bush. BTW in that draft he also selected future Pro Bowl players DeMeco Ryans and Owen Daniels. You tell me why this guy can’t find a job. He’s not popular with the fans, but he can judge talent. Most of these guys, like Casserly, look down the road, so play them to pass on the flashy talent and look for players who will endure, especially in the early rounds.
Finally, spend time doing an in-depth analysis of each team’s immediate and soon-to-be needs. If a big contract expires the following season and they can’t afford to tag the player, a need may well be address immediately to “season” the draftee and determine if they have a viable replacement. Sometimes an unhappy, under-contract player can spur such a selection, like the Cards’ choice of Doucet.
So if you want to be a draftniks, you don’t have to spend hours of time looking at film. You don’t have to assess how good a player’s feet are or how good their mirror technique is. Mostly you have to study history and a team’s roster. Look at what statistics they value and what statistics they lack.
You’ll likely end up with a better bracket, but still be wrong most of the time. On the other hand, you do get to say, “I told you so,” more often. When I used to do my post-draft, mock draft analysis I gave the bracket builders points for getting the position right or choosing a player who could move to the needed position (like a college DE to a 3-4 OLB). BTW, the winners were usually Dave Te and Brian DeLucia, now with Fox Sports. Neither one does a bracket any longer and that should tell you how frustrating this process can be. If you’re still determined to seek glory, go with my best wishes, but remember Dante’s line, “Abandon hope all ye who enter here.”
Well, if you’ve got the time, which I don’t this season, here’s some tips from a guy who’s done it since well before it became fashionable. Begin by playing the club not the prospect. What I mean is simple. Study the club’s recent draft history, especially if the personnel making the decisions remain unchanged. The recent Detroit history provides a good example. If you knew Matt Millen (and even if you didn’t) you could easily see that if he were a coach facing first and goal he’d run the ball. Even after that strategy failed 3 times in a row, he’d run on fourth and goal. He simply believes you do it until you get it right. So when he chose wide receivers 3 years in a row, it should have surprised no one. It also should have surprised no one that he’s not choosing anymore.
Another closely related tip is to see what positions the club has drafted in recent years, particularly in rounds one and two. Most clubs work under a few predictable philosophies. Many teams have positions they attack and ones they avoid. Denver hasn’t taken a running back in round 1 in more than 20 years. The last time they did (1985) they selected the forgettable Steve Sewell. On the other hand, when they have picks in the first two rounds (and sometimes when they don’t) they are almost certain to take a linebacker before round 3 begins. Several teams like to stack up linemen often on both sides of the ball. That’s the old “games are won in the trenches” philosophy.
Another old saw is the best player available theory. Bill Belichick is known for drafting the BPA way. It’s mostly true; though I would argue in recent years he’s moved to a more need-related strategy. Most teams operate under a similar compromise philosophy; they take the BPA but focus on a few positions to determine their BPA. There are still quite a few need-based teams and the Cards are high up on that list. Recent selections like Levi Brown and Alan Branch illustrate the dangers. These athletes often lack sufficient athleticism to play another position, so they are typically all-in propositions. Most teams in the latter group will switch to more of a BPA philosophy during rounds 4-7. During the last 2 rounds, many teams also focus almost exclusively of players who can immediately contribute on special teams.
A number of teams like to trade down; adding additional draft picks and thus not put all their eggs in a few baskets. This is especially true in round one. Others seem to move up and down in an opportunist mode, so their initial draft position means little.
Some selectors believe they are far better judges of talent than others. They make astonishing reaches that often result in disaster. They seek to impress everyone with their “superior” knowledge of quality players. Both Jimmy Johnson and Al Davis have fallen victim to this philosophy. On the other hand, Bill Belichick has proven year after year that he is a better judge of talent than his counterparts; usually bringing home a winner with these choices (like Logan Mankins).
If you want to really dig, see what combine stats teams value. Some teams like strength on their lines, others like agility. So look at previous draftee’s reps and cone drills. For other teams, it’s all about speed. Indy for example, loves speed. I know; Manning can’t run.
The last group to consider is the GM’s with history. Better yet, look for the ones not impressed by hype. The best GM out of a job is Charley Casserly. You may recall I was one of the few who championed his selection of Mario Williams over Reggie Bush. BTW in that draft he also selected future Pro Bowl players DeMeco Ryans and Owen Daniels. You tell me why this guy can’t find a job. He’s not popular with the fans, but he can judge talent. Most of these guys, like Casserly, look down the road, so play them to pass on the flashy talent and look for players who will endure, especially in the early rounds.
Finally, spend time doing an in-depth analysis of each team’s immediate and soon-to-be needs. If a big contract expires the following season and they can’t afford to tag the player, a need may well be address immediately to “season” the draftee and determine if they have a viable replacement. Sometimes an unhappy, under-contract player can spur such a selection, like the Cards’ choice of Doucet.
So if you want to be a draftniks, you don’t have to spend hours of time looking at film. You don’t have to assess how good a player’s feet are or how good their mirror technique is. Mostly you have to study history and a team’s roster. Look at what statistics they value and what statistics they lack.
You’ll likely end up with a better bracket, but still be wrong most of the time. On the other hand, you do get to say, “I told you so,” more often. When I used to do my post-draft, mock draft analysis I gave the bracket builders points for getting the position right or choosing a player who could move to the needed position (like a college DE to a 3-4 OLB). BTW, the winners were usually Dave Te and Brian DeLucia, now with Fox Sports. Neither one does a bracket any longer and that should tell you how frustrating this process can be. If you’re still determined to seek glory, go with my best wishes, but remember Dante’s line, “Abandon hope all ye who enter here.”
