George O'Brien
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In another thread I outlined how the roles played on the Suns fast break define what kinds of players fit into the Suns style. http://www.arizonasportsfans.com/vb/showthread.php?t=75969 In the discussion, it struck me that no one addressed the issue of how opponents try to offset the Suns break - and what the Suns can do to counter.
In brief, the Suns break has five roles: two wing players who go to either corner, a trigger man (think Nash) who pushes the ball up, a hammer who goes inside and finishes (think Stoudemire or even Hunter), and a trailer who comes up late and gets the ball as a kick out or pass from one of the wings and shoots a jumper.
How do you stop the Suns break? To understand how teams try to stop the Suns break, it is first necessary to understand how they try to stop other fast breaks. Then lookat what they have to do differently against the Suns.
For most teams, the purpose of the fast break is to get layups. For this reason, the standard approach to stop the break is to form a "picket line". This is three guys just inside the foul line who are lined up in the main paths to the basket. The outside guys will generally try to drive the offensive player to the baseline. The inside guy tries to push the offensive player toward one of the other defenders and cut off the angle to the basket.
Generally the picket line is set up using the guards and small forward. Their goal is to delay the offense long enough for their inside teammates get back.
As long as the goal is to make a layup, it is very hard to get through the picket line, even when with four or five guys. If anything, extra offensive players can get in each other's way. (Before D'Antoni, the Suns fast break was horrible because they had no spacing).
The Suns fast break negates the main virtue of the picket line -- by shooting over it. If the trigger gets into the foul line area, the defenders cannot cover both the paths to the basket and the wing shooters. Usually they will cover one wing and leave the other open.
This leaves only two guys on the picket line and a potential matchup problem. At best, they have a small forward trying to stop a bigger hammer going to the basket. They also have to worry about the open wing man going back door and the trailer who is left wide open when he gets into range.
Even great individual defenders struggle when the Suns get inside the paint if only three guys are back on defense. Somebody is open. Adding a fourth defender helpes when they "go small" to help get back quicker. However, most teams lose too much because their small lineup is not as good as the Suns small lineup.
Instead, most opposing coaches have decided their only hope is to stop the Suns break at the other end of the court. There are a variety of things they can do to limit the Suns break.
1. Efficient Offense: Teams that score most of the time they get the ball can slow the Suns break down. This is because the Suns don't run as well after made baskets. The fact they run at all is unusual, but generally even slower guys can get back most of the time if they don't turn the ball over and hit their shots. The problem is that this is not as easy as it sounds, even against the Suns defense.
2. Delay of Game Tactics: Even making the basket is not enough, teams try to delay the Suns taking the ball out of bounds by keeping the ball from the Suns player. They will try knocking the ball into the stands, holding the ball etc. It is worth risking a technical if their guys don't have to run as much.
3. Pound the Boards: A lot of teams focus their bigs on getting offensive rebounds. They not only keep the ball out of the Suns hands, but they get extra chances to score. If their bigs aren't fast enough to get back, then they might as well go for the rebounds. However, it does slow their guys getting back even more and it pulls both inside guys down to the baseline, where they have even further to run to get back on defense.
4. Hold their Man: A lot of teams try to keep the Suns from running by grabbing onto their man and not letting him get out and run. With the refs being focused on guys going down court, this is rarely called.
5. Attack the Suns rebounder: A common tactic is to try to steal the ball from the Suns rebounder. It is worth risking a foul if it keeps the rebounder from getting the ball to the trigger man quickly.
6. Attack the Trigger man: Quick point guards will try to harrass the trigger to keep him from getting the ball inside the paint quickly. Besides slowing the trigger, another goal is to force a long pass which gives the other defenders time to react. Tony Parker has had some success against Nash because he is so much quicker (this might not be true against Banks).
Obviously none of these tactics work well on a consistent basis. The Suns generally get a lot of open looks at the basket. When they hit them are very hard to beat. However, the increased emphasis on attacking the rebounder and the trigger is important. It has led D'Antoni to at least explore the notion of using the hammer as a "point center".
We can only guess what D'Antoni was describing in his conversation with Amare a year go after which Amare talked about becoming a "point center." However the rationale seems fairly strong in that it gives another way to push the ball.
As long as the break requires the trigger to push the ball, it means that teams will risk breaking up their picket line in order to harrass the the trigger. However, if the hammer brings the ball up in the role of point center, the opponent's fast break defense has to be completely altered.
For one thing, stealing the outlet pass is much harder if the opponent has to guard both the trigger and the hammer. Plus being in position to guard the hammer in the backcourt takes away from going to the offensive boards.
Once the hammer gets started there is no one in position to slow the hammer down when going down court. Even more important, if one defender is guarding a wing and another is back due to guarding the trigger, this puts the hammer one on one with an isolated defender who has at least one unguarded wing at the defender's back.
Point center is not entirely a new concept. Don Nelson used Marquis Daniels as a point forward with the Mans and briefly used Chris Webber as a kind of point center during his one year with the Warriors in the early 90's. However, fitting a point center/hammer into the Suns break is a major change in the Suns attack.
Obviously Diaw is ideally suited to this kind of point center hammer. It's not entirely clear why this wasn't used more last season. However, I expect to see more of it this training camp. Oddly enough, the Suns triggers makes this approach even more intriguing.
With the point center bringing up the ball, the opposing point guard has a problem. If he guards Nash on the outside, he leaves the other picket defender alone. If he stays on the picket line, Nash gets to play catch and shoot. Banks is not nearly the shooter Nash is, but more of a threat to play hammer because he's a terrific finisher.
I suspect the evolution of the point center hammer is likely to be a key element in the way the Suns look at new personnel. Lots of very good hammer prospects are completely ill suited to be point centers. This doesn't mean they can't contribute, but being able to use players in different roles seriously alters the way teams can try to defense the Suns break.
In brief, the Suns break has five roles: two wing players who go to either corner, a trigger man (think Nash) who pushes the ball up, a hammer who goes inside and finishes (think Stoudemire or even Hunter), and a trailer who comes up late and gets the ball as a kick out or pass from one of the wings and shoots a jumper.
How do you stop the Suns break? To understand how teams try to stop the Suns break, it is first necessary to understand how they try to stop other fast breaks. Then lookat what they have to do differently against the Suns.
For most teams, the purpose of the fast break is to get layups. For this reason, the standard approach to stop the break is to form a "picket line". This is three guys just inside the foul line who are lined up in the main paths to the basket. The outside guys will generally try to drive the offensive player to the baseline. The inside guy tries to push the offensive player toward one of the other defenders and cut off the angle to the basket.
Generally the picket line is set up using the guards and small forward. Their goal is to delay the offense long enough for their inside teammates get back.
As long as the goal is to make a layup, it is very hard to get through the picket line, even when with four or five guys. If anything, extra offensive players can get in each other's way. (Before D'Antoni, the Suns fast break was horrible because they had no spacing).
The Suns fast break negates the main virtue of the picket line -- by shooting over it. If the trigger gets into the foul line area, the defenders cannot cover both the paths to the basket and the wing shooters. Usually they will cover one wing and leave the other open.
This leaves only two guys on the picket line and a potential matchup problem. At best, they have a small forward trying to stop a bigger hammer going to the basket. They also have to worry about the open wing man going back door and the trailer who is left wide open when he gets into range.
Even great individual defenders struggle when the Suns get inside the paint if only three guys are back on defense. Somebody is open. Adding a fourth defender helpes when they "go small" to help get back quicker. However, most teams lose too much because their small lineup is not as good as the Suns small lineup.
Instead, most opposing coaches have decided their only hope is to stop the Suns break at the other end of the court. There are a variety of things they can do to limit the Suns break.
1. Efficient Offense: Teams that score most of the time they get the ball can slow the Suns break down. This is because the Suns don't run as well after made baskets. The fact they run at all is unusual, but generally even slower guys can get back most of the time if they don't turn the ball over and hit their shots. The problem is that this is not as easy as it sounds, even against the Suns defense.
2. Delay of Game Tactics: Even making the basket is not enough, teams try to delay the Suns taking the ball out of bounds by keeping the ball from the Suns player. They will try knocking the ball into the stands, holding the ball etc. It is worth risking a technical if their guys don't have to run as much.
3. Pound the Boards: A lot of teams focus their bigs on getting offensive rebounds. They not only keep the ball out of the Suns hands, but they get extra chances to score. If their bigs aren't fast enough to get back, then they might as well go for the rebounds. However, it does slow their guys getting back even more and it pulls both inside guys down to the baseline, where they have even further to run to get back on defense.
4. Hold their Man: A lot of teams try to keep the Suns from running by grabbing onto their man and not letting him get out and run. With the refs being focused on guys going down court, this is rarely called.
5. Attack the Suns rebounder: A common tactic is to try to steal the ball from the Suns rebounder. It is worth risking a foul if it keeps the rebounder from getting the ball to the trigger man quickly.
6. Attack the Trigger man: Quick point guards will try to harrass the trigger to keep him from getting the ball inside the paint quickly. Besides slowing the trigger, another goal is to force a long pass which gives the other defenders time to react. Tony Parker has had some success against Nash because he is so much quicker (this might not be true against Banks).
Obviously none of these tactics work well on a consistent basis. The Suns generally get a lot of open looks at the basket. When they hit them are very hard to beat. However, the increased emphasis on attacking the rebounder and the trigger is important. It has led D'Antoni to at least explore the notion of using the hammer as a "point center".
We can only guess what D'Antoni was describing in his conversation with Amare a year go after which Amare talked about becoming a "point center." However the rationale seems fairly strong in that it gives another way to push the ball.
As long as the break requires the trigger to push the ball, it means that teams will risk breaking up their picket line in order to harrass the the trigger. However, if the hammer brings the ball up in the role of point center, the opponent's fast break defense has to be completely altered.
For one thing, stealing the outlet pass is much harder if the opponent has to guard both the trigger and the hammer. Plus being in position to guard the hammer in the backcourt takes away from going to the offensive boards.
Once the hammer gets started there is no one in position to slow the hammer down when going down court. Even more important, if one defender is guarding a wing and another is back due to guarding the trigger, this puts the hammer one on one with an isolated defender who has at least one unguarded wing at the defender's back.
Point center is not entirely a new concept. Don Nelson used Marquis Daniels as a point forward with the Mans and briefly used Chris Webber as a kind of point center during his one year with the Warriors in the early 90's. However, fitting a point center/hammer into the Suns break is a major change in the Suns attack.
Obviously Diaw is ideally suited to this kind of point center hammer. It's not entirely clear why this wasn't used more last season. However, I expect to see more of it this training camp. Oddly enough, the Suns triggers makes this approach even more intriguing.
With the point center bringing up the ball, the opposing point guard has a problem. If he guards Nash on the outside, he leaves the other picket defender alone. If he stays on the picket line, Nash gets to play catch and shoot. Banks is not nearly the shooter Nash is, but more of a threat to play hammer because he's a terrific finisher.
I suspect the evolution of the point center hammer is likely to be a key element in the way the Suns look at new personnel. Lots of very good hammer prospects are completely ill suited to be point centers. This doesn't mean they can't contribute, but being able to use players in different roles seriously alters the way teams can try to defense the Suns break.
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