They don’t build on top of their concepts very well. For example, Sean McVay’s offense is built on the outside run. When defenses overplay the outside zone, they run boot. If they overplay the boot, they’ll run a throwback leak concept. Kingsbury’s system lacks staple counters that they can execute with precision.
Week 12, 10:24 remaining in the fourth quarter, second-and-5
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On this play, Kingsbury tried to design a boot off of their speed option, which is unusual, but the design was poorly conceived and executed.
A speed option is when the offensive line leaves the play-side end or linebacker unblocked. The quarterback takes the snap and attacks the edge and can keep the ball or pitch the ball to a running back outside of him. The Cardinals tried to fake a speed option to the left and then boot to the right with a flood concept.
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On a boot concept, the run fake is supposed to fool the backside end, which would allow the quarterback to get outside of him. The problem with this concept is that a speed option doesn’t entice the backside end to chase the play because there’s no threat of a cutback on the play. The Patriots stayed home and defended the play well.
Tight end Dan Arnold came off the line too slow and tried to go around the linebackers, which threw off the timing of the play.
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Murray’s first option in the flat was covered. Arnold was Murray’s second read, but he was too slow and covered. Hopkins could have been Murray’s third read, but he looked like he didn’t know what he was supposed to do and didn’t run a route. Murray ended up throwing the ball away out of the back of the end zone. This lack of precision is littered throughout the Cardinals’ tape and could be a reason why Murray doesn’t throw with more anticipation — he isn’t sure where his receivers will be, or he doesn’t trust them to get to their landmarks.
The Cardinals have major protection issues schematically and talent-wise, but they’re masked by Murray’s ability to scramble and extend plays. All five starting linemen are either average or below-average starters, and they’re better run blockers than pass blockers. The interior of the line gets pushed back a lot, and at times it has trouble handling simple stunts. That’s a problem when your starting quarterback is only 5-10.
Week 12, 10:49 remaining in the second quarter, third-and-10
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Here, the Patriots ran a simple tackle/linebacker twist. The nose tackle shot into the offensive left A-gap, while linebacker Chase Winovich looped inside to the right A-gap. The line slid right, so center Mason Cole should have passed off the nose tackle to his left guard and picked up Winovich.
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The nose tackle slanted and fell on the ground, but the center kept his eyes on him and missed Winovich looping inside. To the offensive right, the Patriots only rushed one. The tackle had help from a chip block. Technically, it’s not right guard J.R. Sweezy’s job to help on the backside, but with two players already blocking the end to that side, he should have looked to help elsewhere.
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Cole and Sweezy didn’t see Winovich until it was too late, and he was able to get in Murray’s face instantly on a simple twist. This lack of awareness and protection breakdown happens far too often.
There are times when Arizona is out-schemed from a protection standpoint. I’m unsure if this is on Murray for not calling the right protection or if it’s on Cole. Also, they don’t have good answers when they’re blitzed. There aren’t hot routes and sight adjustments to go to when Murray is blitzed. Again, Murray’s ability to get away from pressure masks a lot of these issues, but it’s not sustainable.
Week 16, 7:14 remaining in the first quarter, third-and-10
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On third-and-10, the 49ers showed a pressure front with linebacker Fred Warner (No. 54) mugged in the B-gap. Cornerback Ahkello Witherspoon was also on the line of the scrimmage, so the offense should have accounted for him as well. Arnold’s responsibility was to chip the end to his side, but with Witherspoon on the line, someone should have made a call to alert Arnold to maybe just get a hand on the end while keeping his eyes on Witherspoon.
The line slides to the left toward Warner. The center and right side of the line (left of the image) were responsible for the nose tackle, defensive end and Warner. The left side of the line (right of the image) and the running back were responsible for the three defensive players to their side.
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Either Arnold blew his assignment or no one made a call to alert him or change the protection. Arnold chipped the end and no one blocked Witherspoon, who blitzed. Warner dropped back to take Arnold in case he released on a route. Right guard Justin Murray (No. 71) was responsible for Warner but didn’t block anyone initially after Warner dropped. Some elite guards have the awareness to look outside and pick up Witherspoon.
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Witherspoon was untouched, but Murray was able to get away from him and throw the ball away.
The Cardinals don’t have enough answers against the blitz. There are too many instances when Murray is left without a hot read or sight adjustment and is forced to just try to make a play with his feet. Another problem is his height. There are times when defenses will call a blitz or pressure scheme that attacks inside and just have their edge defenders sit back to contain him and try to drop to where his hot routes might be. Kingsbury has to give his offense better tools to combat the blitzes.
In the NFL, play design is about creating mismatches. The Cardinals do not do a good enough job of doing this. Hopkins doesn’t move around the formation enough. According to Pro Football Focus, Hopkins has lined up outside to the left on 523 of his 632 routes this season. He’s still dominant enough to be productive, but his job could be easier.
In the fourth quarter of last week’s 20-12 loss to the 49ers, the Cardinals were down by eight points. After scoring a touchdown, they went for two. Kingsbury called a goal-line fade to Hopkins, which is a low percentage play, but Hopkins is a jump-ball extraordinaire, so it wasn’t a bad call. However, Hopkins lined up to the left and was matched up against the 49ers’ best corner Jason Verrett. The 49ers don’t move their corners, so Arizona likely could have matched up Hopkins with the 49ers’ backup corner (Witherspoon), if they flipped the formation. Murray threw an inaccurate pass, but regardless, the thought process in creating and attacking mismatches was lacking.
At the end of the game, the Cardinals had another chance to tie with a touchdown and two-point conversion. They drove to the 49ers’ 14-yard line and called another fade. This time, they picked on Witherspoon but didn’t match up Hopkins on him. Murray targeted receiver Christian Kirk and underthrew the pass, which was intercepted. Results aside, why wouldn’t you want to match your best receiver against a backup corner in crunch time?
